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Correspondence

January-April 2001

Exchange with Stuart Fischman about "Torah Lishmah" and the Rationale for Mitzvot (2001)

Reasons for the Commandments

1. Stuart Fischman to R. Lamm

1. Stuart Fischman to R. Lamm (2001)

1. Stuart Fischman to R. Lamm (Jan. 1, 2001)

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Correspondence

Exchange with Stuart Fischman about "Torah Lishmah" and Studying and Performance of Mitzvot (1999)

Dear Rabbi Lamm, Hello and shana tova. I’m an admirer of your book Torah for Torah’s Sake, which is useful for clarifying the conceptual disagreements between the Lithuanian yeshiva world and the Chassidic world. I have a question that I appreciate your addressing. On page 146 of your book you quote Rabbi Nachum of Chernobyl quoting the Zera Kodesh who maintains that Moshiach is greater than Moshe and Aharon (שמשי׳ ע״ח). This idea you present as a hallmark of the Zera Kodesh. I see, I think, a resemblance between the Zera Kodesh and Netziv who in Ha’amek Davar (page 196, on Rabbi’s Kriat Shema) also critiques the reason the students of Rabbi Akiva perished rather than Moshe’s, who after all of Sinai’s revelation could not instill the proper qualities of sensitivity and respect in his own students. I don’t know if the Zera Kodesh was influenced by it, especially since the tension can be understood to signify that combining study and deeds goes back a long way, and I don’t know to what the originator owes himself. It just seems to me that the idea by pointing to Moshiach over Moshe again in this way does, in a way, presage the Zera Kodesh. Thank you for your time. Yours truly, Avraham Fischman, POB 110, Efrat Israel
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