המקור העיקרי לרעיון של בטול המצהת לע״ל, רעיון שהכה שרשים בתולדות ספרותנו הדתית בפרט ובהווי' הדתית היהודית בכלל, הוא במדרש תהילים (שוחר טוב) מזמור קמ״ו. (הנוסח הבא שוה בכל ההוצאות של המדרש לרבות הוצאת באבער): "מתיר אסורים, מהו מתיר אסורים, י״א כל הבהמה הנטמאת בעוה״ז מטהר אותה הקב״ה לע״ל, וכה״א מה שהי' הוא שיהי' ומה שנעשה וה' טהורים היו מקודם לבני נח וכה״א לחן כי רק עשב נתתי לכם את כל, מה ירק עשב נתתי לכל אף החי' והבהמה לכל מתחילה, ולמה אסר אותה, לראות מי שמקבל דברין ומי אינו מקבל, ולע״ל הוא מתיר את כל מה שאסר. וי״א אינו מחירן לע״ל, שכח״א אוכלי בשר החזיר וגו' ומה אם למי שהי' אוכלת הוא מכריה ומאבד, הבהמה לא כל שכן. ומהו מתיר אסורים, אין איסור גדול מן הנדה, שאשח רואה דם ואסרה הקב״ה לבעלה, ולע״ל הוא מתירה, (זכרי' י״ג) וגם את הנביאים ואת רוח הטומאה אעביר מן הארץ, ואין טומא אלא נדה שנא' ואל אשח בנדח טומאתה. וי״א אף תשמיש המטה היא אסורה לע״ל, תדע לך שכן הוא שביום שנגלה הקב״ח סני ליתן התורה לישראל אסר תשמיש המטח שלש ימים שנא חיו נכונים וגו ומח כשנגלה עליהם יום א אסרן מתשמיש המטה שלשת ימים, לע״ל שהשכינה ביניהם אינם אסוריןן ומחו מתיר אסורים, אסורי מות ואסורי שאול." ע״כ דברי המדרש במלואם.קשה לקבע בדיוק מוצאו הראשון של מאמר זה. באבער כבר הוכיח בראיות ברורות וחותכות (1) כי המדרש הזה ממזמור קי״ח ועד הסוף אינו מעטו של אותו המחבר שחבר חציו הראשון. בדפוס חראשון של חמדרש (קאנשטאנטינא, ה״א רע״ב – 1512) נדפס רק עד קי״ח, ומשם ועד הסוף נדפס בפעם הראשונה בשאלוניקי שנח 1515 יחד עם פירוש ר מתתי חיצהרי. אך באבער (2) נוטה לדעת חאברבנאל (3) שמאמרנו זה עיקרו מפי ר משה הדרשן הידוע (4).השתלשלות נוסח המדד 2. חשש הזיוח.המלומד ר יעקב רייפמאנן (5) קורא תגר על תוכן המאמר הזח ומטיל בו חשד הזיוף. הנ״ל איננו מוסיף שום ידיעה חדשה על תולדות המדרש ויחוסו, ורק מטביעות עין של חכם אומר, "קרוב מאוד כי המאמר חזה נוסף במדרש מאח אחד המשגים עור בדרך", ובאמת אין זו הפעם הראשונה שנשמע קול הערעור על מאמר זה, האברבנאל (6) כבר כתב, "ואני חושד גם בהגדה זאת היש בלשונה עולה ואם זייפה המפקר כדרכו, וראוי לקבלו אחר שאין אתי הספר לבחינה מאחר שקבלוהו המתווכחים". ומתקבלת על הדעת השערתו זו של האברבנאל שאין עיקר המדרש מ״אחד המשגים…

The challenge posed by the changing world scene to traditional Judaism in its philosophical aspects has been discussed by previous lecturers. The advent of modern science brought with it a new conception of the universe and of man’s place within it, and Judaism was required to respond. This philosophical dialogue is of great significance. But ultimately, Judaism’s survival depends on Halakhah. If Halakhah is not preserved, then no matter how successful the philosophical adjustments, Judaism will not endure. Conversely, if Halakhah can be preserved within the changing world, then philosophers may struggle – but they will have something of enduring value to reflect on.Just as the philosophies nourished by modern science conflicted with Jewish philosophy, so too the practical discoveries and inventions of natural science presented great challenges to the halakhist. And just as in natural science the science itself is primary and philosophy flows from it, so too in Judaism – Halakhah is the given, the primary datum, the raw material. Philosophy must grow out of Halakhah, not the reverse.Indeed, the modern age of science has posed mighty challenges to Halakhah:Artificial insemination (late 19th century – reproduction without copulation) Electricity, radio, television – including ethical questions of communication Halakhah had three options in response to modern science and technology:A) Succumb – argue that Halakhah and science occupy different worlds and Halakhah is therefore obsolete; permit anything new by default B) Ignore – retreat into the ghetto, declare all innovation forbidden C) Creative Response – treat the challenge of modernity as a catalyst for internal growthIt is a testimony to the inner vitality of Halakhah that it chose the third path.As one editorial in Science put it, “dither” – kinetic friction is better than static inertia. Halakhah has always existed “in a dither” – from the days of Moses until today – and it is precisely this tension that has kep…

Orthodoxy is not a movement within Judaism, no, it is Judaism itself. Orthodoxy is the sole legitimate heir of Judaism, and if it has any faults, these are not the faults of Orthodoxy as a movement but rather those of contemporary Judaism. Certainly there are faults. The chief fault lies with that wing within Orthodoxy which has run away from history, which has shut itself off from the world, which refuses to come to terms with changing reality, which has made “splendid isolation” its watchword while awaiting the arrival of the Messiah. Yet there is another wing within Orthodoxy, too, which proclaims that, although the Jewish people as a people does not indeed follow the ordinary course of history and is not subject to the standard laws of history, and therefore cannot be “normal” in the true sense of the term—nevertheless it should not decline to partake in history. This trend in Orthodoxy has grown especially strong in the United States. The great difficulty facing the Jew today is that of living in both worlds—a difficulty which has found concrete expression in the way of life of the State of Israel—but most Orthodox Jews in the United States have already learned how to live in both worlds, and the introduction of combined programs of secular and religion education is one proof positive of this.As for convenience—that is a relative notion. Personally, I find it very convenient to be an Orthodox Jew, because I find it convenient to be at peace with myself as a whole Jew. But he who defines convenience not in terms of making peace with himself but rather with the pleasures of the moment, with easy life, will doubtless find the Conservatives more convenient, and even more so the Reform. Convenience of this kind has been one of the great American principles (at least until three years ago), and, as Rabbi Yehuda the Pious used to say, “As is the custom of the Christians, so too is the custom of the Jews. . .”The success of the Conservative and the Reform is based mos…

Dear Rabbi Lamm, I enjoyed your letter, courtesy American Airlines, and I’m estopped to criticize anyone’s penmanship. The person who advances a proposition characterized as fundamental must answer, I think, to several questions: 1. Is the proposition truly fundamental? Were there no processes of reason, based on history, experience, precedent, logic or whatever, that led to the original formulation of the proposition. 2. When, and in what circumstances, was the proposition first stated? Is there authority directly on point in the Bible or in ancient formulations of the oral law? Or does the proposition depend on later formulation and, if so, upon what exegeses? 3. Can or should there by any adjustment, by the legislators receiving the position advocated, with other social needs?My supposition in putting these questions is that many propositions, though they may be styled as fundamental and perhaps believed to be fundamental by those holding to them, are "less" fundamental than they seem, at least in terms that are relevant to the finding of a public consensus. In terms of the abortion debate, answers to the several questions above may expose to public debate the inner processes of legal (religious) decision and the methods and circumstances by which the rights and immunities of a human fetus were articulated in the first instance. Laying bare the considerations for, and the exegeses yielding, the first and successive formulations of the proposition that all fetuses are entitled equally with choate humans to the equal protection of the laws will remove the "fundamental" halo immunizing the proposition from attack, and will enable the legislature to weigh the religious argument against other aspects of the public weal – e.g., the disproportionate number of fatalities arising from abortions sought out by the poor because of lack of safer alternatives.The question, in my opinion, is not "when is a living object considered a human being." I would formulate it as whethe…

Jews who have not been brought up in the full Jewish tradition are often taken aback at the way in which Judaism expresses its concern about marriage and married life. Even when predisposed to a sympathetic appreciation of the Torah tradition, such people cannot understand the severely legal manner of the Jewish doctrine of marriage. The Talmud, discussing the relationship between husband and wife, speaks of mitzvah and din, of halakhah and issur (prohibition), of rights and duties – exactly, it seems, in the same terms of its discourse on torts, false witness, labor law, or trade and barter. Is there no difference between the area of domestic relationships and these others? Is not the derogatory charge of “legalism” so often pressed against us justified in the light of Judaism’s treatment of marriage in the language of commandments and prohibitions, laws and duties? How can the modern mentality understand that these laws refeiTing to family life should constitute as much as one-fourth of the entire “Shulhan Arukh," the code of Jewish law?First, let us repeat what a recent Israeli rabbinic writer said, something which appears rather astounding and yet is completely true: woe to the couple that regulates its married life solely on the basis of the “Shulhan Arukh!" Law adjudicates rival claims, it attempts to reconcile opposing demands; and whereas such accommodation of conflicting claims can save a bad domestic situation from disintegrating entirely, it is certainly not the ideal way to live a married life. It is unfortunate if husband and wife, 01• parents and children, think only of their rights and their demands upon each other. For a family to be successful there must be love and patience and tenderness and a willingness to forgive and forget and forego. ,Thus does the Talmud (Kidduxhin 41a) teach that the famous commandment, v’ahavta le’reiakha kamokha, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” refers in the first instance—to one’s wife! And Mai-monides codifi…

Having said all this (and it should be understood as a self-evident principle), we must add that love itself is an insufficient basis for life. King Solomon, the wisest of all men, proclaimed that azah ka-mavet ahavah, “love is as strong as death.” Love is powerful, one of the most powerful forces in the universe; but, unregulated and undirected, it can also be deadly and destructive. Why is this so? First, without law we cannot distinguish between licit and illicit love; the limits of love’s expression are gone, and one does not know where it will lead. Second, human love, for all its eminence in life and in doctrine, does not remain the highest value of all. Judaism teaches man that he must submit his entire life and his most cherished commitments to the higher authority of God Himself. There is a love that transcends our love for parents and wife and children—and that is love for God. There is a judgment that surpasses any human judgment no matter how ethical-—and that is the divine judgment. This, indeed, is the teaching of the akedah: Abraham, despite his passionate and deathless love for his only son, bows his head and submits to the divine decree to offer up his only son as a sacrifice. The law of God takes precedence over the love of man.Third, without law, love not only “conquers all,” but it destroys all—including itself! Law is that which allows love to endure within the context of life. The mitzvot provide the framework in which true and authentic love can flourish; other-wise it is in danger of spending itself prematurely. Look at our society: rarely before in human history has the word “love” been as popular. Despite some recent assertions that “love is dead,” it remains the cheapest commodity on the market today. It fills the scrapbooks of countless teenagers, it is the chief attraction of all pulp magazines, it is sentimentally blared forth on television and peddled in the cinema. At the same time, our society is successively discarding all traditio…

Finally, we must not ignore those (and they may well be a majority of human beings) who cannot or do not experience love. Such people are no less decent, no less sensitive, no less moral or ethical than those who do love. They have every right to a decent life and to the protection of their emotions, of their families, of their children – no less so than those blessed with the gift of feeling love. Jewish law attempts to create the conditions under which love can flourish in human relationships, and under which people can live humanly with each other even if they do not attain love. If one examines the consistent manner in which the Talmudic Sages applied the commandment ve’ahavta le'reiakha kamokha, he will discover that its correct translation ought to be not “Love thy neighbor as thyself,” but “Act lovingly towards thy neighbor as thou wouldst act towards thyself” (see the commentary of Rabbi S. R. Hirsch on this verse). It is precisely because of Judaism’s concern for the integrity of marriage and home that it legislates on such matters. In fact, the more important the subject, the more does Judaism hedge it about with laws. It is because marriage is so sacred and sexuality so sensitive that the Torah prefers to protect it legally rather than wax poetic about it romantically. Torah considers marriage and family and yihus (the legitimacy of lineage) so significant, that it will not allow them to be left to the whim of sudden passion and instantaneous infatuation.That is why gittin and kiddushin (divorce and marriage) abound in such complex technicalities. Marriage is a lifelong relationship of the most significant and far-reaching consequences which is initiated by a single ceremony or contract. Therefore, we must make sure that both parties know exactly what they are doing, that both offer their free and untrammelled consent, in order that no avoidable errors be perpetuated. Hence, the Halakhah’s insistence upon the formality of the ring, of the witnesses, of …

Regretfully, no matter how liberal or moderate an Orthodox Rabbi wants to be, no matter how he wishes to keep up good relations with Jews of differing convictions, he can only view with the deepest sorrow the havoc wrought by Reform when it abandoned Jewish marriage law. This was probably the most historically irresponsible act in the recent annals of our people. Based on a piece of spurious scholarship, Reform proclaimed that a civil divorce is adequate, and that a get is unnecessary for remarriage. It overlooked the glaring inconsistency of insisting that marriage should be a religious ceremony, while divorce may lie a civil ceremony. As a result, it cavalierly dismissed the consideration that the Halakhah considers the previous marital bond still in full force. Therefore, the person who remarries without a religious divorce is considered as living in adultery, and the children of such a union are illegitimate.Now, illegitimacy, uuimzerut, imposes a terrible burden on such children: they are forbidden to marry any others save those in the same category. Too much human tragedy has resulted from this irresponsibility for us to remain silent about it. That is why, with all our concern with religious freedom in Israel, we must draw the line at matters of r/ifti>1 an<l kidduxhin. It is bad enough that Reform has destroyed the the happiness of so many Jews and Jewesses in this country, often forcing a young couple to make a tragic choice between love for each other or loyalty to the basic tenets and laws of their faith; we do not need this to destroy the unity of the Jewish community of the State of Israel as well. One can only hope that enlightened Reform had-ers will themselves come to this realization and attempt to correct the situation — or at least not endeavor to impose it on Israeli Jews.These matters are not always pleasant to discuss. Yet without them there is no Judaism. They are too important and too dangerous for us to pass over them in polite silenc…

The prophet Isaiah proclaims, ki mei noah zot li, “for this is as the waters of Noah to me.” Just as I have sworn, says God, not to bring another flood to the world, so will I not punish my people again. But, the Zohar (Lev., 14b) remarks, is this not a strange expression? Should the waters of the flood not be referred to as such, mei mabbul, rather than as mei Noah, the waters of Noah? The answer of the Zohar provides us with a marvelous moral insight. It tells us that when the Almighty wishes to bring destruction upon a world deserving of such cataclysm, He first informs the pious of that generation, hoping that they will intercede for their fellow men before God, and that they will try to arouse their contemporaries to righteousness so that, having changed their ways, God may feel free to change His decree. Thus did Moses plead before God and preach to his fellow men, and thus did the prophets do after him. Noah however, did nothing of the sort. He was concerned only for himself. He did not care about his contemporaries. When God told him that a flood would destroy every existing thing, he built an ark for himself and his family, concerned only for Noah and no one else. Because of this spiritual self-centeredness, because of his religious indifference towards the well-being of his fellow men, he was damned with the eternal stigma of having this flood known as mei Noah, “the waters of Noah.” The devastation, the destruction, the calamity bear his name for eternity.Let us not, in our days, be guilty of the same kind of spiritual egotism in the false guise of not wanting to interfere in the lives of others. We are not interfering when we bring to our fellow-Jews, who have abandoned Jewish marriage law, the message of Torah. We are discharging our responsibility to them and to their children, and to their children’s children, and to generations yet unborn, informing them and cautioning them about the Torah’s law of marriage and legitimacy.Let us discharge our histor…

Dear Rabbi Lamm: Your essay “Law and Love” in the February 23, 1968 edition of the "Bulletin" has filled me with disquiet and I should like to deliver myself of some thoughts. You say “We are discharging our responsibility to them [our fellow Jews who have abandoned Jewish marriage law] and to their children. . .and to generations yet unborn, informing them and cautioning them about the Torah's law of marriage and legitimacy." I gather you mean that we, the Orthodox, are responsibly upholding the letter of our law of marriage and divorce and woe to those who do not heed. In my opinion, this view is irresponsible, not responsible, in terms of real problems with which people become involved. If, as I believe is the case, people are asked to decide whether to submit to a set of laws in circumstances where applications are manifestly unjust and harsh or ignore the law, the law will be ignored and held up to ridicule, and indifference and disrespect to all its precepts will be encouraged. As I suggest below, the law regarding divorce is in immediate need of reform and it is not seemly to caution others unless there is a will and intention to bring such a reform about. Let us take the case of a woman, wronged by an adulterous husband who abandons her and their children and moves to a distant state, perhaps to remarry or otherwise to take up life anew. From every point of view, the best course for the woman, for herself and her children, would be to divorce herself from her husband and remarry. Civil law permits this. With the husband's consent, Jewish law permits this. In times of old, consent of the husband could often be compelled for by custom and law a man could only with difficulty escape the jurisdiction of the rabbis. Consent cannot be compelled today. Should not law recognize this changed condition? Was God at Sinai deficient in his omniscience so as not to foresee such a changed condition? I cannot believe that religious institutions can be so paralyzed as not t…