In attempting to introduce some semblance of order, from the critical point of view of modern technology, into the current Polemics in the world of Halacha concerning the use of the incandescent bulb on the Shabbat, we must bear in mind, at the very outset, one important fact: that, at the present stage of the game we can come to no definitive conclusion. The entire problem is exceptionally delicate, because of the great stress laid in the Halacha on the laws of Shabbat and particularly on the laws concerning fire, and we must not forget that we are, figuratively as well as literally, playing with fire. Let no one be "moreh heter"—act lightly, because of the conclusions of one Rabbi or one authority. Let me briefly review for you the fundamentals of the laws of Shabbat as delineated by the Sages of the Mishna and the Talmud. The מלאכות שבת, the types of "work" which are forbidden on Shabbat (and the term "work" is used here in a technical sense, not in the layman's sense, just as the term "work" has a special technical meaning for the physicist) are derived from the types of work needed for the building of the Mishkan, since both passages—relating to Shabbat and Mishkan—are סמוכות, next to each other. The number of such categories of work is 39, the ל״ט מלאכות שבת. These 39 major categories are known as אדות, and each אד is subdivided into minor categories known as תולדות, the requirement being that each Toladah be similar to its Av in some certain specified manner. Let us now single out four of these Avot which will be of special interest to us. We have הדערה, making a fire, and extinguishing a fire. On הדערה the Torah issued a special prohibition, aside from the general sentence. "Thou shalt not make a fire in any of thy dwelling places on the day of the Shabbat!" Another Av Melachah is __________, which literally means "cooking", but, as we shall see later, has certain other and more inclusive connotations. The fourth Av Melachah I wish to mention is __________,…

לפני זמן מה הופיע בעיתונות מאמר אשר עורר תגובה ציבורית נרחבת ומידה רבה של פולמוס. מאמר זה היווה דו"ח על הרצאה של הביולוג האנגלי הנודע סיר יוליאן האקסלי באוניברסיטת שיקגו, בכינוס לציון יובל המאה ל"מוצא המינים" של דרווין. במיוחד מעוררת עניין עמדתו של האקסלי כלפי הדת והאבולוציה – בה טען כי העולם זקוק לאידיאולוגיה חדשה שמרכזה האבולוציה. את המאמר אזכיר לא כי מדובר באירוע בודד אלא משום שהוא אופייני לרוח המדעית הרווחת, במיוחד בקרב סטודנטים אשר הכרתם את המדע טרם התאזנה. ה"ניו־יורק טיימס" תיאר את האקסלי כצורר־דת וכיוצר־דת – מצד אחד כותב הספד לדת המסורתית, ומצד שני כמנסח דת חדשה. נתמקד בשני ההיבטים – בקטרוגו על הדת ובסנגורו על דת אבולוציונית – כדי להציע תגובה יהודית. ראשית, במידת־מה אנו מסכימים לביקורתו של האקסלי על דת המשמשת קרדום לרודנות. אכן, רדיפת כופרים ואפליה בשם הדת הם תופעות מוכרות – כיהודים, אנו נושאים צלקות חסידות נוצרית. אך מדען אחראי כמותו היה חייב לבחון את כלל הנתונים. פרופ' גורדון אלפורט הראה כי רבים מלוחמי החירות והסובלנות – ממשה רבנו ועד מייסדי אמריקה – היו דתיים. האקסלי שוגה כאשר הוא מכליל על הדת תוך התעלמות מהמדענים הנאצים שדגלו באי־אמונה והובילו לאסונות מוסריים. שנית, הטענה כי האבולוציה והדת נוגדות זו את זו – וכי הראשונה "ניצחה" את השנייה – שגויה. ספר בראשית איננו עוסק בטכניקה של בריאה אלא בעובדת היות אלוקים בורא, והטכניקה הוסתרה ("מעשה בראשית"). כבר חז"ל והוגים כמו הרמב"ם והרב קוק ראו בהתפתחות תהליך אלוקי. לפיכך, אין מניעה תאולוגית לראות באבולוציה את הדרך בה פעל הבורא. יתרה מזו, האבולוציה אינה עובדה מוכחת – כפי שציין ז'אן־פול ארון, מדובר ברעיון ולא בעובדה מדעית. תחומים היסטוריים במדעי הטבע אינם ניתנים להוכחה ניסויית, ויש להתייחס אליהם בספקנות. כאשר האקסלי טוען כי הדת היא "מפלט" – אנו עונים כי טענה זו ניתנת להיפוך. כמו שיש המוצאים בדת דמות־אב מנחמת, יש גם הכופרים בה מתוך מרד באביהם. אין מקום להעביר ויכוח ענייני לפסים פסיכולוגיסטיים. כשהאקסלי עובר מ"שובר דת" ל"בונה דת", הוא נכשל. דת שמטרתה "למלא צורך" – אפילו אם צורך זה הוא הצלת העולם – איננה דת, אלא פרימיטיביזם דתי. הדת איננה אמצעי לרווח אישי, בריאותי או פוליטי – אלא מחויבות לאמת נשגבת. דתו של האקסלי – המ…

The existence of rational, sentient beings on a planet other than earth is no longer a fantastic, remote possibility conjectured by imaginative and unrealistic minds. It is declared not a possibility but a probability by an ever-growing chorus of distinguished astronomers and eminent scientists in all fields. Already there has been established a new science — “exobiology.” the study of forms of extraterrestrial life — although neither specimens of such living matter nor definite proof of their existence is yet available. The speculation of these men of science is that in many corners of the universe life has developed to a degree far higher than here on earth, so that — in the words of Walter Sullivan at the beginning of his splendid volume on the subject, We Are Not Alone1 — “not only are we not central in the scheme of things, but we may be inferior, physically, mentally and spiritually, to more highly evolved beings elsewhere.” Almost all descriptions of the current attempts to discover such extraterrestrial life are accompanied by exhortations about the profound implications for humanity’s view of the universe and the need for theologians and philosophers to re-examine their doctrines. When the existence of life elsewhere is established, and especially if some contact is made with intelligent beings elsewhere, we will be confronted by as much of a challenge to our established way of thought as when the Copernican revolution displaced the earth from the center of the universe and set in motion a religious and philosophical upheaval that has but recently run its course. One of the most persistent advocates of a radically new philosophy is the famous Harvard astronomer, Harlow Shapley. who in 1918 located the center of our galaxy (the Milky Way) insome 50,000 light years away. Shapley finds in the probability of intelligent extraterrestrial life “the intimations of man’s inconsequentiality.” Vannevar Bush, one of the worldV most distinguished men of science, has a…

One of the principal issues on which the Hasidic-Mitnagdic controversy turns, in its concern with substantive theological matters, is the question of the relative weight to be assigned to the study of Torah and prayer. It is the purpose of this essay to compare the manner in which each of these two movements treated the problem, using as the spokesmen for these groups two distinguished rabbinic scholars and thinkers: the Hasidic teacher and founder of the HaBaD movement, R. Shneour Zalman of Ladi, and the founder of the Volozhiner Yeshiva and disciple of the Gaon of Vilna, R. Hayyim of Volozhin. Both were commanding personalities and ideologists of their respective viewpoints, and yet were moderates, in a period of almost unrelieved, bitter polemics at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries.The question of Torah vis-a-vis Tefillah is a special case of the larger problem of study vs. practice (of the mitzvot) as such; indeed, the relative evaluation of Torah and prayer is the most sensitive barometer for the axiological preference for study over practice or vice versa. It is unnecessary to add that Judaism affirms both study and worship as major values, and a preference for one by no means implies the exclusion of the other. The corpus of a living Judaism is incomplete, indeed inconceivable, without either the head or the heart. Yet it is a question of no little import whether primary emphasis should be laid on the study of Torah, giving Judaism a rigorously intellectualist bent with corresponding educational and social consequences, or on worship, thus stressing the existential and experiential rather than the purely cognitive themes of Jewish religious existence.R. Hayyim accorded the highest possible significance to the study of Torah.¹ Alone amongst all others in the Lurianic tradition, he assigned the origin of the preexistent, hypostatic Torah to the loftiest realms within God Himself: the Unnameable regions beyond the World of Atz…

The feeling of love that is expected from every individual Jew for his people (ahavat Yisrael) is an existential fact that sometimes assumes mystical proportions. Associated with this love for Israel is its obverse, the injunction against hating one’s fellows in his heart. And the exception is the commandment to hate the rasha, the evil-doer.These are themes which stir passions and, indeed, have played a not insignificant role in the political polemics of our day, both enriching and obscuring the rhetoric of intra-Jewish dialogue.Concomitant with these problems, and deeply intertwined with them, is that of Jewish identity, often phrased as who does and who does not belong to kelal Yisrael, the Jewish people.*But these are also biblical or rabbinic commandments, and it is instructive as well as enlightening to view them more dispassionately as halakhic categories. Such a treatment, as the reader will surely notice, is not without its problems, but it is well worth the enterprise. At the very least, such an objective legal focus will make possible a modicum of calm analysis, certainly more than is otherwise likely in dealing with such fateful questions.“Thou shalt love thy neighbor1 as thyself” (Leviticus 19:18) is the biblical source of the commandment to love one’s fellow Jews, as codified by Maimonides2 and the author of Sefer ha-Hinnukh.3What is the scope of this mitzvah? There is, according to Halakhah, a mitzvah to hate evil-doers and, prima facie, love and hate are mutually exclusive. Are, then, evil-doers outside the pale?*This is not the same as the current “Who is a Jew?” question, which refers to one’s individual identity as a Jew. Our problem is that of. as it were, citizenship in the Jewish people. This will be clarified below. This article is an abbreviated version of a chapter of my forthcoming Halakhot ve-Halikhot. especially translated and revised for this festschrift. We will divide our consideration of th…