The study of Torah is one of the most fundamental commandments in Judaism; it outweighs all the other precepts. The question of what should be the motivation for such study depends upon how one defines the talmudic concept of Torah lishmah - usually translated as “Torah for its own sake.” The definition of this teleology of study is, in turn, usually contingent upon one’s general orientation to Jewish values: the role of the intellect as against ethical and ritual performances, inwardness vis-a-vis external acts, and so on. Moreover, the degree to which one insists upon pure motivation, i.e., study lishmah, depends upon the significance one attaches to the study of Torah as such: the more one esteems the act of study, the less one is disposed to demand lishmah, however one interprets the term; and the less one’s relative emphasis on the study of Torah, the more likely is his insistence upon lishmah. (3) The various definitions of the term Torah lishmah can generally be grouped in three categories, with the understanding that they are not mutually exclusive:

In this context, it is interesting to analyze the writings on the study of Torah lishmah by R. Yehudah Leib Pukhovitzer, a late seventeenth-century rabbi and preacher whose books reflect the kabbalistically oriented piety of his times. (10) As a representative of this period, his works tell us something about the religious spirit and views of seventeenth-century Polish Jewry and about its religious and educational institutions and problems. This analysis is made particularly necessary because of some recent assertions about Puknovitzer’s concept of Torah lishmah which this writer considers highly questionable. Relying mostly on kabbalistic sources, Pukhovitzer fully subscribes to the functional definition of Torah lishmah: He who studies lishmah merits both this world and the world-to-come, as is written in the Zohar. . . . The reason for this is that Torah (i.e., study) without [the performance of] the commandments is as nothing. Therefore one [who studies Torah lishmah] merits two worlds: one for his Torah and one for his commandments. (11) He then cites, approvingly, two interpretations of the dictum of R. Meir, that “who-soever engages in Torah lishmah merits many things,” (12) by R. Elijah de Vides, the first of which defines lishmah as studying with the intention of putting into practice that which is studied. (13) Clearly, therefore, to study lishmah means to study Torah in order better to perform the commandments of the Torah. This is no isolated passage in the works of Pukhovitzer. Elsewhere (14) he supports the definition of lishmah by R. Isaiah Halevi Horowitz15—to carry out what God has commanded us. He considers this definition the peshat or literal signification of the term. (10) Other such references to the functional definition of the lishmah concept abound throughout his works.

Pukhovitzer also anticipates the cognitive definition of study lishmah that was later to be elaborated and popularized by R. Hayyim of Volozhin: There are those who intend, by their dialectical skill (pilpul), to boast, as if to say, “What a wise man I am, how brilliant! I can, by my dialectical acumen, discover forty-nine ways of proving ‘creeping things’ ritually pure,” and thus become famous and praised amongst people, as happens so unfortunately often in our generation. Thus [do people study Torah] for other, ulterior motives which are unacceptable to the Lord. Rather, the main intent of discourse [in Torah] should be to arrive at the halakhic truth, to elucidate the truth; for by means of debate and dialectics is the truth elucidated. (17) Although, in this particular passage, he does not explicitly identify the cognitive motive of study as lishmah, nevertheless the context clearly implies it, this section coming immediately after a description of Torah not studied lishmah.

Interestingly, Pukhovitzer’s view of the relationship between Torah as such and its individual commandments prefigures the concept of Torah and mitswoth by R. Hayyim. The latter maintained that not only is Torah more significant than the other commandments, but it is totally inclusive; Torah is the whole of which the mitswoth are the individual parts. Whereas the general halakhic assumption is that Study is but one aspect of Practice (in that the commandment to study Torah is one amongst 613), R. Hayyim shows that Practice is only one aspect of Study. The mitswoth are individual organs; Torah is the hypostasized mystical organism.18 This conception, which undergirds the cognitive interpretation of lishmah, is adumbrated by Pukhovitzer as follows:
So one who engages in [the study of] Torah augments light and brings great effluence into all of its individual commandments, for all of them derive from the root and essence of the spirituality of the Torah; for it (Torah) includes them all, and they branch out from it, as is well known. However, one who engages in only one commandment (other than Torah) contributes power and light only to it alone and fills it with the capacity to draw upon the inner essence of Torah ... for the whole sustains the parts, whereas the parts do not sustain the whole. (19) Thus far we have seen that there is nothing exceptional in Pukhovitzer’s writings on lishmah. He repeats the functional definition which has roots in tannaitic times, and anticipates the severely halakhocentric definition offered by the mitnagdic theoretician, R. Hayyim of Volozhin, as an alternative to hasidic devequth. However, a problem arises with regard to Pukhovitzer’s references to the second definition of lishmah, what we have called the devotional definitions, especially the kabbalistic. Or, to be more accurate, the problem does not really arise of itself at all, but has been raised for us by a distinguished contemporary historian who has professed to find in Pukhovitzer a reinterpretation of Torah lishmah and, with it, certain far-reaching social consequences. Prof. Jacob Katz, describing the changing position of the kabbalist, writes: “A good deal of the prestige enjoyed by the scholar who pursued the study of Torah lishmah now passed to the man whose learning found expression not in public leadership, halakhic decisions, and the teaching of Torah, but in studying the Kabbalah and in performing the mitzvot in accordance with its dictates, a skill which only initiates were capable of appreciating.” (20) This enhanced prestige of the kabbalist, according to Katz, resulted in “propaganda for the founding of schools for individuals who study Torah lishmah....” More significantly, he maintains that “lishmah is occasionally defined not as unselfish personal intention, but as engaging in mystical studies. We also know of the founding of such schools and of the support of scholars of this cloistered type.” (21) Katz here adds in a footnote that “R. Yehudah Leib Pukhovitzer prefers the founding of schools for the study of Torah lishmah over support for students of the Yeshivah.” (22) If Katz is right, then we have not only a completely new interpretation of lishmah with the most significant theoretical consequences, but the institutionalization of this new conception in the form of separate schools dedicated to this idea. A careful analysis of the sources Katz cites will reveal, however, that they do not support his theory. We find no mention of such exclusive schools. And the writings of R. Yehudah Leib Pukhovitzer yield nothing as radical as the identification of Torah lishmah as the study of Kabbalah. We have seen that Pukhovitzer repeatedly refers to the functional view of lishmah and also speaks of the cognitive definition. However, he also writes favorably of the kabbalistic definition of lishmah. He cites the Zohar’s forceful condemnation of self-interest in the study of Torah: scholars who study because of the desire for reward, whether in this world or the next, are like barking dogs who cry out, “give, give”; such people are blind and heartless. Why then should one study? What is the proper motivation? The object should be redemptive: the classical kabbalistic ambition of releasing the Shekhinah from its exile and reuniting it with its “husband,” the Holy One. Study lishmah means study for the purpose of contributing thereby to the unity of the World of the Sephiroth.' (23) On the basis of this passage, Pukhovitzer fortifies his statement, previously mentioned, (24) that study without lishmah causes man to merit only this world, whereas study lishmah brings him the blessings of both worlds: “By means of study lishmah one unites the Shekhinah up above, and thus the purpose of his study is to perform the work of his Master (i.e., to serve God’s purpose); whereas those who study but not lishmah, all their effort is to sustain this world, and thus they serve themselves.” (25) Pukhovitzer often quotes later kabbalists for support in his denunciations of those who study Torah she-lo lishmah, i.e., for selfish reasons. He clearly describes what he means by she-lo lishmah—and he by no means intends those who fail to study the Kabbalah. Thus, in one lengthy passage, he cites R. Isaac Luria and R. Hayyim Vital as his authority for castigating those “who have made the Torah a spade to dig with, . . . who study in order to receive reward and additional stipends, and also to be included amongs the heads of the Yeshivot and judges in the court, so that their names and reputations will cover the earth.” (26)

It is clear beyond doubt that what Pukhovitzer has suggested is nothing new or startling; he is within the mainstream of normative Jewish piety. The kabbalistic definition of lishmah, which Pukhovitzer adopts along with the other two, is quite clear: the study of the classical texts, biblical and rabbinic, with a kabbalistic purpose in mind. It does not imply the study of kabbalistic texts. The mystical element in study lishmah has reference merely to the intention, not the content or subject matter. Were Pukhovitzer to propose anything as novel as the theory Katz attributes to him, he would have stated so explicitly. Furthermore, if Pukhovitzer had meant to define lishmah as the study of Kabbalah, and to imply along with it the social and institutional exclusiveness Katz speaks of, he would have emphasized this definition of lishmah as a way of reenforcing the element of exclusiveness. The fact is that he gives it no more prominence than he does to the functional and cognitive definitions, especially the former.

What might possibly be the cause of misunderstanding is the following: This matter [the study of Torah she-lo lishmah] causes him to propose novellae which are not true (emeth), as is mentioned in the writings of Luria . . . "Lach deed of a man causes an angel to he created, and therefore the angel will correspond to the deed. If one studies Torah lishmah, without any ulterior motive at all, so the angel created therefrom will be very holy, lofty, and faithful in all ways. So if he studies Torah without any errors, the angel will be without errors and mistakes. But if that Torah [studied] contained some evil thought, she-lo lishmah, or some errors or mistakes, so will the angel created therefrom possess an admixture of evil, for it will have been created from two elements, good and evil, and therefore [the angel] will not be faithful in all ways.” And therefore that angel will bring him to [propose] novellae which do not accord with the truth (emeth). (21)

The source of possible confusion here is the term emeth, truth. It often refers to the Kabbalah; it is so used regularly, for instance, by Nahmanides. It would, however, be stretching the imagination too far to attribute this symbolic signification to the word as used in the context of this passage. The term here unmistakeably means “truth” in its ordinary sense: ideas which correspond to the actual meaning of the material studied. Pukhovitzer here uses the word emeth quite pointedly as the opposite of ta'uth weshibbushim, error and mistakes. (28)

The solitary reference to plumbing the “secrets of Torah” (the usual euphemism for esoteric knowledge) that I have been able to find in Pukhovitzer’s works in connection with lishmah means only that mystical graces are the consequence of but not the contents of studying lishmah. (28, 29) R. Hayyim too refers to mystical illumination as the result of studying Torah lishmah;3° but in the case of both writers, the subject matter of the Torah study remains the classical texts.

Having established that Pukhovitzer accepts all three standard definitions of lishmah in rabbinic literature and proposes no new understanding of the concept, it is important to follow through on Katz’s thesis to see where his notion has led him. In doing so we shall discover that this one error in the interpretation of Pukhovitzer perforce results in invalid conclusions based upon it.

Having identified lishmah with the study of Kabbalah, and attributed this occupation to an emerging coterie of kabbalists—among whom he counts the Gaon of Vilna (31, 32)—who held themselves aloof both from ordinary people and traditional halakhic scholars, Katz then claims the discovery of a new attitude towards the public support of scholars:

1 Thus, Peah 1:1—“The study of Torah excels them all,” and elsewhere throughout theentire literature.

2 Sifre (ed. Friedman) Eqev, 48; A vot 6:1; Nedarim 62a, etc.

3 The documentation for this assertion is too extensive for, and essentially irrelevant to, the purposes of this article. An elaborate discussion and appropriate references may be found in my heretofore unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Study of Torah Lishmah in the Works of Rabbi Hayyim of Volozhin, (submitted at Yeshiva University, 1966), chaps, v-viii. All that follows in this article concerning the general theme of the study of Torah, and especially study lishmah, is based upon sources discussed in greater detail in the above work.

4 Sifre, loc. cit.: Ber. 17a.: J. T.. Ber. 1:5: Sefer Rasidim, ed Margoliot (Jerusalem 1950), No. 944; R. Elijah de Vides, Reshith Rokhmah (Jerusalem-New York 1958), Introduction, pp. 2a, 3b; R. Isaiah Halevi Horowitz, Shene Luhoth ha-Berith (Jerusalem 1959), pp. 99-101.

5 Ber. 5b; Midrash Tehillim (ed. 8. Buber), 31:9; pp. 240f.; all through Seder Eliyahu, see Introduction by Friedman to his edition of this work, pp. 109-113.

8 Sifre (ed. Friedman) to Wa-ethanan, 32, p. 73a; Sotah 31a; J. T. Ber. 9:7 and Sotah 5:5; Maimonides, Commentary to the Mishnah, end of Makkot. and Code, HU. Teshuvah, 10:4, 5; Sefer Rasidim, No. 289; Nahmanides, Commentary to the Pentateuch, to Dt. 6:5; Crescas. Or Adonai, 2:6, chaps, i and ii.

7 Zohar Radash. Tiqqunim, p. 63a, b; R. Hayyim Vital, Peri Ets Hayyim, beginning of Shaar Hanhagath ha-Limmud.

8 Keter Shem Tov, p. 19c; R. Pinhas of Korzec (Koretz), Liqqutim Yeqarim, p. 4b; R. 149
9 R. Hayyim of Volozhin, Nefesh ha-FJayyim, 4:3, based on Ned. 62a and commentary of R. Asher, ad loc.: cf. Avot de R. Nathan (Version A) to Avot 2.12.

10 Pukhovitzer, who died in Palestine in the 1680’s, was the author of four works, mostly collections of sermons and some halakhic material. They are: Divre FJakhamim, Qeneh Hokhmah, Derekh Hokhmah, and Kevod Hakhamim. Information about him, which is quite sparse, may be obtained from Herman (Hayyim) Michael, Or ha-Hayyim, p. 464, Jewish Encyclopedia, vol. x, p. 92, q. v.

11 Qeneh Hokhmah, p. 18c.

12 Avoth 6:1.

13 Reshith Hokhmah, p. 3b.

14 Derekh Hokhmah, p. 24b.

15 Shene Luhot ha-Berith, pp. 99-101.

10 Derekh Fiokhmah, p. 24b and d; Divre Hakhamim, Part I (Shaar ha-Avodah, chap, v), p. 43 a. Pukhovitzer’s Concept of Torah Lishmah 151

17 Derekh ffokhmah, p. 25b.

18 See Nefesh ha-fjayyim, 1:6 and 5:30, end. This stands in contrast to the hasidic view that because God is uniformly immanent in all the commandments, Torah included, they comprise an essential unity, such that all of them and each of them provides access to God; so the Baal Shem Tov, quoted by R. Jacob Joseph, Toledoth Yaakov Yosef to Yithro,

19 Divre tjakhamim, Part I, p. 42c.

20 Katz, Jacob, Masoret u-Mashber (Jerusalem 1958), p. 258. References will be to this original Hebrew edition, which contains full notes. Translations in this article are based mostly on the English edition, Tradition and Crisis (New York 1961) pp. 223f.

21 Ibid., in the Hebrew; the paragraph is missing in the English.

22 Ibid., n. 23, referring to Pukhovitzer’s Derekh Hokhmah, p. 26a.

23 Zohar Hadash, Tiqqunim, p. 63a, b. See too Reshith Hokhmah, toe. cit.

24 Supra, n. 11.

25 Qeneh Hokhmah, p. 18d.

26 Quoted by Pukhovitzer, Derekh IJokhmah, p. 24d, from Vital’s Introduction to his Ets Ijayyim.

21 Derekh Ijokhmah, p. 25a.

28 This was also the understanding of the unknown author of IJemdath Yamim who plagiarized Pukhovitzer and copied the passages mentioned with only slight modification, indicating that he too understood them in the conventional, non-mystical sense; see Ijem-doth Yamim, Part III, p. 50. On this work, see Yaari, Abraham, Taalometh Sefer (Jerusalem 1954); the article by Scholem in Behinot (1955), no. 8, pp. 79-95; and the three exhaustive articles by I. Tishbi in Tarbitz, vols. 24-25, and his Netive Emunah u-Minuth (Ramat Gan 1964).

30 Nefesh ha-IIayyim 4:21.

81 Katz, op. cit., p. 258, n. 23, relying on Klausner, Vilna bi-Tequfath ha-Gaon (Jerusalem 19421, pp. 16-20. This conventional view of the Gaon has, however, been challenged by Moshe Shmuel Shapiro-Shmukler. See his “Li־Demuth ha-Gaon mi-Vilna” in Hadoar (no. 33, 1926), recently reprinted in Reb Mo.iheh Shmuel we-Doro, published by Shapiro-Shmuklers sons and friends (New York 1964), pp. 30, lOOf.

32 Katz, op. , cit., p. 259.

38 Ibid., n. 25: Kevod IJakhamim; p. 46b.

84 Ketuboth 111b.

88 Loc cit. . .

36 Ibid., n. 23. ’ - , .-

87 Gelber, N. M., Toledoth Yehude Brod in A rim we-Imahoth be-Yisrael, vol. vi, pp. 62f.

80 Ibid., p. 405.

40 Katz, op. cit., p. 258, n. 23; Derekh Hokhmah, p. 26a.

41 Derekh IJokhmah, p. 26b.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid. Cf. Divre Ilakhamim, p. 43c.